State v. Neal Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 42806 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-27-2015
State v. Neal Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42806
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Neal Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42806" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5514.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5514
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIAN E. NEAL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) No. 42806 
) 
) Nez Perce Co. Case No. 
) CR-2014-3285 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NOV 2 7 2015 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY ................................................................................................... 1 
The District Court Erred By Granting Neal's Suppression 
Motion Because Sergeant Yount's Investigative Detention 
Was Not Unreasonably Extended ......................................................................... 1 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 5 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) ............................................................................. 4 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) ..................................................... 3, 4 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) ..................................................................... 3 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 139 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2006) .................................... 2, 3 
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207 P.3d 182 (2009) ................................................... 3 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ..................................................... 3 
ii 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred By Granting Neal's Suppression Motion Because Sergeant 
Yount's Investigative Detention Was Not Unreasonably Extended 
During an automobile search, based on probable cause from a drug dog's alert, 
officers found evidence of narcotics crimes in Neal's car. (R., pp.192-94.) While Neal 
was booked into jail, officers also found heroin on his person. (R., p.194.) Neal moved 
to suppress the evidence, asserting that the searches violated his constitutional rights. 
(R., pp.117-18, 127-48.) The district court granted Neal's suppression motion, 
concluding that "Trooper Yount unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the stop 
based solely on speculation" of a drug crime. (R., p.200.) 
The state appealed, demonstrating that any expansion of the scope of Sergeant 
Yount's investigation was supported by "the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded 
to justify detaining an individual," and the detention was therefore never unreasonably 
extended. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Sergeant Yount pulled over Neal at around 
12:40 a.m. on reasonable suspicion of several traffic infractions: "failing to signal when 
merging, failing to signal a lane change, and for window tinting darker than allowed by 
law." (R., pp.193, 197.) Investigation of these infractions produced evidence of 
additional criminal violations which led to additional investigations, including Neal's lack 
of valid insurance, potential drug crimes, and a records check of Neal's probationary 
status in Washington. (R., p.193; see also Video at 12:44:00-1 :08:43.) Before 
Sergeant Yount had completed his various investigations, the drug detection dog 
arrived on scene and alerted on Neal's vehicle. 
In reaching its conclusion that the traffic stop was unreasonably extended, the 
district court committed multiple errors. First, as noted in the Appellant's brief, the 
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district court erred when it determined that Sergeant Yount's suspicion of drug activity 
was not reasonable because it failed to note, much less weigh, all of the circumstances 
giving rise to the officer's reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-13.) Second, 
even assuming that under the totality of all of the circumstances Sergeant Yount lacked 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity, the traffic stop still was not unreasonably 
extended. As shown by the video, a large portion of Sergeant Yount's investigation 
prior to the arrival of the drug detection dog was focused on checking Neal's records 
and verifying his probationary status. (See Video at 12:57:00-1 :05:30.) As argued in 
the appellant's brief, that records check was a reasonable part of a traffic stop. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) But the district court failed to consider that investigation in 
its analysis. And that was error, too. 
In response, Neal asserts that the district court's "legal conclusion, that Officer 
Yount's extended detention was not supported by sufficient facts 'to support a 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity' is based upon its view of Officer Yount's credibility 
and assessment of factual inferences in the case, all of which is vested in the trial 
court." (Respondent's brief, p.13 (citation omitted).) While credibility determinations 
may be the sole province of the trier of fact, its factual findings still must be supported 
by substantial evidence. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. 
App. 2006). ("We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless those 
findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are 
therefore clearly erroneous.") As shown in the state's opening brief, the trial court's 
factual findings regarding the basis for Sergeant Yount's reasonable suspicion were not 
supported by substantial evidence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) Moreover, the 
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court's factual findings regarding Neal's appearance, based, according to the district 
court, on its review of the video (R., pp.198-99) are in fact contradicted by that video. 
(See Appellant's brief, p.12 with citations to Video.) 
Citing to State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), Neal 
asserts that the state "waived any objection" that the court's findings were "clearly 
erroneous" by failing, he claims, "to present argument or authority." (Respondent's 
brief, p.13, n.5.) But the state provided both. In its standard of review section, the state 
set out the controlling authority: A trial court's factual findings must be supported by 
substantial evidence. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) The state then argued that the district 
court's factual findings regarding the accuracy of the officer's description of Neal's 
appearance, as shown by the video, were clearly erroneous. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-
12.) Factual findings which are "unsupported by substantial and competent evidence ... 
are ... clearly erroneous." Covert, 143 Idaho at 170, 139 P.3d at 772. 
Again citing to Zichko, Neal asserts that the state failed to provide authority for its 
arguments regarding Sergeant Yount's investigation of Neal's probation status. 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) Again, contrary to Neal's assertions, the state both cited 
authority and provided argument. It cited Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 
1615 (2015), for the uncontroversial proposition that "[a] records check is an expected 
part of a traffic stop and does not constitute undue delay"; and it cited Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) and State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 
P.3d 182, 185 (2009), for the proposition that probationers enjoy a reduced expectation 
of privacy. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) The state argued, based on this authority, that 
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checking a probationer's status is analytically the same as any other records check and 
is reasonable, even though it may take a few minutes longer. (Id.) 
"[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). The reasonableness 
standard does not require perfectly optimized police efficiency. While noting that the 
traffic stop lasted 26 minutes prior to the drug dog's alert, the district court failed to 
consider the totality of the circumstances justifying the detention. Application of the 
correct legal standards to this case demonstrates that Sergeant Yount's investigative 
detention was not unreasonably extended because each expansion of that investigation 
was supported by "the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 
individual." See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. The district court's order should 
therefore be reversed and this case remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Neal's suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 2015. 
~p...SP_E_N_C_E_R ___ _ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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